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I. In the Achmea judgment,1 the Court of Justice ruled that the principle of autonomy of 
EU law prevents two Member States – Slovakia and the Netherlands – from setting up 
an investor-to-State dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism via a bilateral investment 
agreement (BIT) inter se.2 Achmea has crucial constitutional relevance: not only does it 
have a dramatic impact on arbitration within the EU, but might prevent the Union from 
concluding investment agreements with third countries. 
The Court of Justice will soon rule on the later issue: in Opinion procedure 1/17,3 the 
Court is requested to decide on the compatibility between EU Treaties and the Canada-EU 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), which includes an investor-to-
public authorities dispute settlement mechanism (the Investment Court System, ICS).4 
Although the case is pending, several commentators suggested that its outcome is prede-
termined by Achmea: the same reasons that motivate the incompatibility between intra-
EU arbitration and EU principles in Achmea might imply the inconsistency between CETA 
and EU Treaties.5 Other authors, however, read Achmea in a different manner: the find-
 
1 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 March 2018, case C-284/16, Achmea [GC]. 
2 Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 29 April 1991, 2242 UNTS 205, p. 82. 
3 Court of Justice, request for an opinion submitted by Belgium on 13 October 2017, opinion proce-
dure 1/17. 
4 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada, of the one part, and the 
European Union and its Member States, of the other part, signed on 30 October 2016. 
5 Inter alia, C. ECKES, Don’t Lead with Your Chin! If Member States Continue with the Ratification of CETA, They 
Violate European Union Law, in European Law Blog, 13 March 2018, www.europeanlawblog.eu; S. GÁSPÁR-
SZILÁGYI, It Is Not Just About Investor-State Arbitration: A Look at Case C-284/16, Achmea BV, in European Papers, 
Vol. 3, 2018, No. 1, www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 357 et seq., p. 370. 
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ings of this judgment are allegedly circumscribed to intra-EU investment agreements and 
are motivated solely by the specific characteristics of intra-EU arbitration.6 
Should Achmea be interpreted as an indication that the Investor Court System includ-
ed in CETA is not compatible with the EU legal order? The present Overview answers this 
question, to provide insight into the Court’s understanding of the principle of autonomy 
and its potentially strategic use of precedents. It is argued that the Court anticipated, to a 
certain extent, the result of Opinion 1/17, although its position is ambiguous. 
The investigation begins by suggesting that, at first sight, Achmea does not seem to 
be intended as a precedent for Opinion 1/17; nonetheless, a closer investigation points 
in the opposite direction (section II). It is then submitted that, if the Court applied in 
Opinion 1/17 the same test it used in Achmea, it would probably conclude that the CETA 
tribunal is not compatible with EU law (III). The conclusion explores the consequences of 
Achmea from the perspective of Opinion 1/17 and provides explanations for the appar-
ently contradictory views expressed by the Court (IV).  
II. In Achmea, the Court of Justice answered the preliminary question of the German 
Federal Court of Justice by conducting a three-pronged test. To be compatible with EU 
law, a tribunal should have at least one of three characteristics: it should not interpret 
EU law, it should belong to the judicial system of the Member States, or its awards 
should be reviewable by the Member States’ courts.7 As the arbitral tribunal set up by 
the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands BIT has none of these characteristics, it has adverse 
effects on the autonomy of EU law. If applied in Opinion 1/17, this test might possibly 
lead the Court to rule that the CETA Tribunal is incompatible with EU law, as shown in 
the next section. Before discussing the application of the Achmea test to the CETA Tri-
bunal, at any rate, one should preliminarily wonder whether the Achmea test should be 
applied to the CETA tribunal in the first place.  
The Court ostensibly applied the Achmea test to “an arbitral tribunal such as that re-
ferred to in Art. 8 of the [Czechoslovakia-Netherlands] BIT”,8 i.e. an arbitral tribunal set 
up by two Member States (hereinafter, “intra-EU tribunal”). Does this caveat limit the 
relevance of Achmea as a precedent?  
 
6 Inter alia, L. PANTALEO, The Participation of the EU in International Dispute Settlement: Lessons from EU 
Investment Agreements, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2018, p. 62; P. IANNUCCELLI, La Corte di giustizia e 
l’autonomia del sistema giurisdizionale dell’Unione europea: quousque tandem?, in Il diritto dell’Unione eu-
ropea, 2018, p. 300-303; J.H. POHL, Intra-EU Investment Arbitration after the Achmea Case: Legal Autonomy 
Bounded by Mutual Trust?, in European Constitutional Law Review, 2018; A. DIMOPOULOS, Achmea: The princi-
ple of Autonomy and Its Implications for Intra and Extra-EU BITs, in EJIL:Talk!, 27 March 2018, 
www.ejiltalk.org. 
7 Achmea [GC], cit., paras 39-56. 
8 Ibid., para. 43; see also, to that effect, paras 39, 49 and 50. 
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The Achmea test seems to be relevant only for a specific class of international tribu-
nals, i.e. those that decide disputes affecting the rights of individuals. Achmea is con-
cerned with the removal of disputes from the jurisdiction of the courts of the Member 
States and, consequently, with the functioning of Art. 267 TFEU and the uniformity of EU 
law, as shown in the next section.9 Therefore, Achmea does not seem to be directly rele-
vant in respect of tribunals that decide disputes between international subjects, such as 
the Dispute Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization.10 Achmea consequently 
does not have the consequence of rendering the EU incapable of setting up interna-
tional tribunals in toto:11 obstacles would exist only in respect of bodies deciding dis-
putes affecting individuals – mostly, investment tribunals.  
The CETA Tribunal certainly decides disputes affecting the rights of individuals, but 
it would be set up by an agreement concluded by the Union and a third State, not via an 
agreement between Member States. Would the Achmea test apply to such an “extra-EU” 
Tribunal, or does it apply only to intra-EU tribunals, such as that at issue in Achmea?  
The introductory remarks and the final considerations of Achmea seem to suggest, 
at least at first sight, that the test is applicable only to intra-EU situations. The Court fo-
cuses its introductory remarks (paras 31-38) on the principle of mutual trust, a principle 
that is applicable to the relations between the Member States and that is not applicable 
to the relations with third States. The Court argues that primacy and direct effect of EU 
law have given rise to principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal relations 
“binding [the] Member States to each other”.12 These States are linked by “common val-
ues” that justify “mutual trust”,13 they “ensure in their respective territories the applica-
tion of and respect for EU law”,14 including fundamental rights, and they must consider 
each other to be complying with EU law.15 It is “in that context” that national courts and 
the Court of Justice must ensure the full application of EU law in all Member States, no-
 
9 Ibid., para. 36; cf. Court of Justice, Opinion 1/09 of 8 March 2011, para. 79. See also Court of Justice, 
Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017, para. 292. 
10 On the alleged inconsistency between Achmea and the Court of Justice’s case-law on WTO dispute set-
tlement, see B. ARP, Comment to Achmea, in American Journal of International Law, 2018, p. 466 et seq., p. 471; A. 
DIMOPOULOS, Achmea: The principle of Autonomy and Its Implications for Intra and Extra-EU BITs, cit. 
11 According to G. Kübek, during the hearing of Opinion procedure 1/17, “several Member States, the 
Council and the Commission urged the Court to consider the need to cultivate the development and 
strengthening of a rule-based international order, especially in current times. The autonomy of the EU 
legal order principle should not be interpreted so narrowly as to prevent the EU from remaining in or ad-
hering to any international dispute resolution mechanisms”, see G. KÜBEK, CETA’s Investment Court System 
and the Autonomy of EU Law: Insights from the Hearing in Opinion 1/17, in Verfassungsblog, 4 July 2018, 
www.verfassungsblog.de. 
12 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 33; see Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para. 167. 
13 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 34. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.; See also opinion 2/13, cit., para. 191. 
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tably by using the procedure of Art. 267 TFEU, to ensure the consistency, the full effect, 
and the “autonomy” of EU law.16  
While the Court’s introductory considerations do not permit per se to answer the 
preliminary question, it is “in the light of those considerations” that the Court then for-
mulates the Achmea test.17 It might, therefore, be surmised, at least in principle, that the 
Court’s reference to mutual trust at the beginning of its considerations might be indica-
tive of its intention to narrow down the implications of Achmea and prevent it from 
functioning as a precedent for Opinion 1/17.18  
The coda of the judgment (paras 57-59) distinguishes the legal background of Achmea 
from that of Opinion 1/17 in a more explicit manner. Once having performed the Achmea 
test on the Slovakia-Netherlands arbitral tribunal, the Court recalls that the EU can in 
principle conclude an agreement establishing a tribunal responsible for the interpretation 
of its provisions and whose decisions are binding on EU institutions, including the Court of 
Justice.19 However, such a rule does not apply to the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands BIT, 
which was concluded “not by the EU but by Member States”.20 The BIT, therefore, calls in-
to question “mutual trust” among the Member States, the preservation of the “particular 
nature of the law established by the Treaties”, as well as the principle of sincere coopera-
tion.21 It is significant that the Court mentions the principle of mutual trust again, at the 
end of the judgment, after having raised it in its introductory remarks. And it is even more 
striking that the Court expressly stresses the difference between the legal regimes appli-
cable to the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands BIT, on the one hand, and to the agreements 
concluded by the EU (such as CETA), on the other hand.  
The relevance of the judgment’s coda is reinforced by its apparently superfluous 
character. The Court de facto reaches the conclusion of Achmea in para. 56, directly after 
the performance of its three-pronged test. Here the Court notes that the contested BIT, 
because of its characteristics, could prevent disputes from being resolved in a manner 
that ensures the full effectiveness of EU law. This consideration could have permitted 
the Court to answer the preliminary request: an agreement between the Member 
States that reduces the effectiveness of EU law is inevitably incompatible with it. None-
theless, the Court introduced three further paragraphs – the coda – whose sole function 
seems to consist in distinguishing Achmea from Opinion 1/17. It might perhaps be ar-
gued that the unnecessary recalling of EU’s ability to submit itself to an international 
court at the end of a judgment concerning an international agreement concluded by the 
 
16 Achmea [GC], cit., paras 36-37. 
17 Ibid., paras 38. 
18 See J.H. POHL, Intra-EU Investment Arbitration after the Achmea Case, cit. 
19 Provided, of course, that the autonomy of EU law is respected, see Achmea [GC], cit., para. 57. 
20 Ibid., para. 58. 
21 Ibid. 
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Member States can be seen as “expressive of the Court’s willingness to narrow down 
the implications of its ruling”.22 
However, that is not necessarily the case. While the introduction and conclusion of 
Achmea seem to distinguish this case from Opinion 1/17, the principles interpreted in the 
judgment may be relevant for Opinion 1/17 too. The principle of autonomy is indeed ap-
plicable to both intra- and extra-EU tribunals. In Achmea, the Court links autonomy to mu-
tual trust among the Member States, but we know from the case-law that autonomy does 
not apply solely in the context of intra-EU relations, but also to the agreements between 
the Union and third States.23 In other words, the principle of EU law autonomy is not “de-
limited by the principle of mutual trust” among the Member States.24 
The Court seems indeed to imply that Achmea may have consequences beyond 
purely intra-EU situations. The referring tribunal had asked whether the Czechoslo-
vakia-Netherlands BIT violated Art. 344 TFEU, a provision introducing obligations for the 
Member States.25 Nonetheless, the Court held that the BIT has an adverse effect “on the 
autonomy of EU law”26 at large, a principle that is expressed “in particular” in Art. 344 
TFEU,27 but that also applies to the Union as such. The interpretation of EU autonomy 
provided by the Court in Achmea, therefore, appears applicable mutatis mutandis in the 
context of Opinion 1/17, too.  
Moreover, and most importantly, the test developed by the Court in Achmea does 
not refer to any intra-EU element and is consequently prima facie applicable to extra-EU 
tribunals too, as shown in the next section. The Court could have answered the prelimi-
nary question by using principles relevant only within the EU, such as non-
discrimination or mutual trust. Such arguments were in fact raised before the national 
judge and the Court of Justice.28 For instance, the Court could have ruled that intra-EU 
investment agreements are incompatible with EU law because they are premised on 
the lack of confidence in the judiciary system of the state of destination of the invest-
ment, which is de facto bypassed via arbitral tribunals. By contrast, a similar argument 
could not be made in the context of CETA, as there is no “mutual trust” between the EU 
and Canada, at least not under EU law.  
 
22 L. PANTALEO, The Participation of the EU in International Dispute Settlement, cit., p. 62. 
23 See e.g. Court of Justice: opinion 1/91 of 14 December 1991, paras 30-46; opinion 1/92 of 10 April 
1992, paras 18-35; opinion 1/00 of 18 April 2012, paras 11-46. 
24 See a contrario J.H. POHL, Intra-EU Investment Arbitration after the Achmea Case, cit., p. 15. See also 
pp. 22-23. 
25 Art. 344 TFEU: “Member States undertake not to submit a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Treaties to any method of settlement other than those provided for therein” (italics by 
the author). See Achmea, paras 14-17. 
26 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 59. 
27 Ibid., para. 32. 
28 Ibid., para. 14; opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 19 September 2017, case C-284/16, Achmea, 
paras 256 and 268. 
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Had the Court utilised a test based on mutual trust to solve Achmea, this judgment 
would not have raised significant expectations with respect to Opinion 1/17. On the 
contrary, the Court’s choice to employ standards potentially applicable to extra-EU tri-
bunals may suggest that the Achmea test might be employed again in Opinion 1/17. 
If so, would the CETA Tribunal pass the Achmea test? 
III. The central part of the Achmea judgment (paras 39-56) contains a test that, as noted 
above, has three elements. A tribunal (deciding disputes affecting the rights of individu-
als) that lacks all three elements is incompatible with the principle of autonomy of EU 
law. It is worth stressing that these three elements are alternative, not cumulative: if a 
tribunal has at least one of those elements, it is apparently compatible with EU law. 
This section presents the test and applies it to the Slovakia-Netherlands tribunal 
and the CETA Tribunal. For ease of exposition, the three elements of the test are not 
discussed in the same order in which they are found in Achmea.  
According to the Achmea test, a tribunal should, in the first place, be “situated within 
the judicial system of the EU”, meaning that it may be regarded as a “court or tribunal of 
a Member State within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU”.29 Only a “court or tribunal” would 
be capable of making preliminary references to the Court of Justice under Art. 267 TFEU, 
which may ensure the full effectiveness of the rules of the EU.30 In Ascendi Beiras, the 
Court held that an arbitral tribunal could be considered as a court or tribunal under Art. 
267 TFEU, inter alia, because it was created by a national law.31 Differently, the arbitral 
tribunal in Achmea “is not part of the judicial system of the Netherlands or Slovakia”, be-
cause of the “exceptional nature” of its jurisdiction compared with that of national 
courts.32 The distinction would seem to lie in the source of the tribunal’s authority: an 
international agreement rather than national law. Similar considerations might apply a 
fortiori to extra-EU tribunals. If a tribunal constituted by an agreement between two 
Member States is not part of the EU judicial system, a tribunal constituted via an 
agreement between the EU, the Member States and a third state (e.g. CETA) may hardly 
be part of that system.33  
 
29 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 43. 
30 Ibid., para. 43. 
31 Rectius, a decree having the force of a law, see Court of Justice, judgment of 12 June 2014, case C-
377/13, Ascendi Beiras, paras 29 and 34; see also Achmea [GC], cit., para. 44; see also P. IANNUCCELLI, La Cor-
te di giustizia e l’autonomia del sistema giurisdizionale dell’Unione europea, cit., p. 294. 
32 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 45. 
33 In Achmea the Court discusses the possibility that the arbitral tribunal might be a “court common 
to a number of Member States”, see Achmea [GC], cit., paras 47-49. Since the Court reaches a negative 
conclusion in Achmea, it can be assumed that the CETA Tribunal cannot be considered as a court common 
to the Member States, especially because it includes a non-EU state as a party. 
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The second condition of the Achmea test applies specifically to those bodies that are 
not part of the EU judicial system. To be compatible with EU law, they should adopt 
awards “subject to review by a court of a Member State”, which may then issue a prelimi-
nary request to the Court of Justice.34 According to the Court, the standard of review en-
sured in the case of the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands BIT is insufficient. This agreement 
requires the arbitral tribunal to apply the United Nations Commission On International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules, which grant the tribunal the possibility to choose 
its seat and, consequently, the law applicable to the procedure governing judicial review 
of the validity of the award.35 The arbitral tribunal in Achmea chose to sit in Frankfurt, 
which made German law applicable to the procedure governing judicial review. German 
law provides only for limited review, concerning, in particular, the validity of the arbitra-
tion agreement and the consistency with public policy. In light of the case-law of the Court 
of Justice, such a limited review might be compatible with EU law, as long as it concerns 
commercial arbitration.36 However, the Court held in Achmea that "arbitration proceed-
ings such as those referred to in Art. 8 of the BIT are different from commercial arbitra-
tion proceedings", because they derive, not from the freely expressed wishes of the par-
ties, but from a treaty by which the Member States "agree to remove from the jurisdiction 
of their own courts" disputes which may concern the application or interpretation of EU 
law.37 Again, it would seem that the problem lies with the source of the tribunal’s authori-
ty: being constituted via an international agreement, an international arbitral tribunal 
does not benefit from the lax standard of review that is granted in the case of arbitration 
set up via a contract.38 Being CETA an international agreement, as much as the Czecho-
slovakia-Netherlands BIT, one may argue that the standard for judicial review of the 
awards of the CETA Tribunal should be as high as that applicable to the BIT. Considering 
that CETA allows the parties to identify the arbiters’ seat,39 and consequently the law ap-
plicable to the review of awards, there is the possibility that those awards might not be 
subject to sufficient review by a court of a Member State.40 
The third – and most crucial – condition is that the arbitral tribunal should not resolve 
disputes “liable to relate to the interpretation or application of EU law”.41 The Czechoslo-
 
34 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 50. 
35 Art. 8, para. 5, of the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands BIT, cit.; Achmea [GC], cit., para. 51. 
36 See Court of Justice, judgment of 26 October 2006, C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, paras 34 to 39; see al-
so Achmea [GC], cit., para. 54. 
37 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 55. 
38 See also J.H. POHL, Intra-EU Investment Arbitration after the Achmea Case, cit., p. 21. 
39 See e.g. Art. 8.23, para. 2, let. c), allowing the submission of claims under UNCITRAL rules; cf. Art. 
18 of the UNCITRAL Arbitration rules. 
40 In addition, one may note that CETA allows investors to submit claims under ICSID rules, which do 
not allow for a review of the award, see CETA, Art. 8.23, para. 2, let. a) and b), as well as Art. 53, para. 1, of 
the ICSID Convention. 
41 Achmea [GC], cit., para. 39. 
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vakia-Netherlands BIT expressly affirms that the arbitral tribunal decides on the basis of 
the law, taking into account, inter alia, the laws of the contracting party and international 
agreements between them.42 As EU law is both a law of the parties and the product of 
agreements with them, the arbitral tribunal could inevitably be called to interpret it.43  
What about the CETA Tribunal? The negotiators of this agreement sought to avoid 
conflicts with the Court of Justice, by stressing in Art. 8.31, para. 2, CETA that the Tribu-
nal cannot “determine the legality of a measure under domestic law” and that its appre-
ciation of domestic law “shall not be binding upon the courts” of the parties. Therefore, 
the awards of the Tribunal do not formally have the effect of “binding” the Union to a 
particular interpretation of EU rules - something that the Court had found problematic 
in its earlier case-law.44  
However, in Achmea the Court seems to have raised the bar: the question is not 
whether the tribunal can adopt interpretations of EU law “binding” on Union institu-
tions, but whether the disputes before the tribunal are liable to relate to the “interpreta-
tion” of EU law. The mere fact that a tribunal decides a dispute affecting individuals by 
interpreting EU law may trigger an interference with the autonomy of EU law,45 possibly 
because such an interpretation might generate a “factual pressure” on the conduct of 
the Member States and, hence, on the Court and its interpretative monopoly.46  
It is not necessary that the tribunal actually interprets EU law (something that the 
Achmea tribunal was not doing): the “abstract possibility”47 for the tribunal to interpret 
EU law is sufficient to render the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands agreement incompatible 
with EU law. Such an attention for purely potential situations is not surprising, consider-
ing that in Opinion 2/13 the Court had found that the “very existence of […] a possibility” 
of conflicts between the European Convention of Human Rights and EU primary law 
triggered a violation of autonomy.48 
 
42 Art. 8, para. 6, of the Czechoslovakia-Netherlands BIT, cit. 
43 Achmea [GC], cit., paras 40-42. 
44 Cf. opinion 1/00, cit., para. 13; opinion 2/13, cit., para. 184. See further A. DIMOPOULOS, Achmea: The 
principle of Autonomy and Its Implications for Intra and Extra-EU BITs, cit. 
45 P. IANNUCCELLI, La Corte di giustizia e l’autonomia del sistema giurisdizionale dell’Unione europea, cit., p. 
291. 
46 S. HINDELANG, Repellent Forces: The CJEU and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in Archiv des Völker-
rechts, 2015, p. 68 et seq., pp. 74-76; see also H. LENK, An Investment Court System for the New Generation of 
EU Trade and Investment Agreements: A Discussion of the Free Trade Agreement with Vietnam and the Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada, in European Papers, Vol. 1, 2016, No. 2, 
www.europeanpapers.eu, p. 665 et seq. 
47 S. WUSCHKA, Investment Protection and the EU after Achmea, in Zeitschrift für Europarechtliche Studien, 
2018, p. 25 et seq., p. 38. 
48 See e.g. opinion 2/13, cit., para. 208; see also para. 109. See further P. EECKHOUT, Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?, in Fordham International Law Journal, 
2015, p. 955 et seq., particularly pp. 966-967, and 974-979. 
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Therefore, from the perspective of Opinion 1/17, the relevant question is not “may 
the CETA Tribunal bind the EU to an interpretation of EU law”, but rather “may the CETA 
Tribunal interpret EU law”? At first sight, this would not seem to be the case. According 
to Art. 8.31, para. 2, CETA, in determining the consistency of a measure with CETA, the 
Tribunal may consider the domestic law of the disputing Party only “as a matter of fact”. 
This seems understandable because, as a matter of principle, an international body 
should consider domestic law as a matter of fact.49 Nonetheless, one cannot exclude 
that the CETA Tribunal may interpret EU law when it adjudicates potential violations of 
CETA. Art. 8.31, para. 2, CETA implicitly acknowledges this possibility, by admitting that 
the Tribunal may give a “meaning” to domestic law – albeit one nonbinding for domestic 
courts. Furthermore, Art. 8.28, para. 2, admits that the CETA appellate Tribunal may re-
verse a Tribunal’s award based on, inter alia, “manifest errors in the appreciation of the 
facts, including the appreciation of relevant domestic law”.50 If there can be two “appre-
ciations” of domestic law, one might assume that such law is not a fact, but can be “ap-
preciated”, viz. interpreted, in different manners.51  
CETA negotiators presumably anticipated this issue, since they agreed, in Art. 8.31, 
that the Tribunal is not free in the appreciation of domestic law but must follow the 
“prevailing interpretation” given to the domestic law by the “courts or authorities” of the 
parties. It is remarkable that the negotiators tried to bind the CETA Tribunal to the do-
mestic practice of the parties, as this is generally not the case.52 Nonetheless, the CETA 
tribunal might have a certain latitude in the identification of what constitutes a “prevail-
ing interpretation” of EU law: is it only the interpretation of the Court of Justice, or does 
it include the decisions of the EU General Court or those of national courts? Should the 
CETA Tribunal take into account the practice of non-judicial “authorities” at the EU or 
national level – such as the European Commission or national governments – as Art. 
8.31 CETA seems to suggest? It cannot be excluded that the CETA Tribunal might select 
the “prevailing interpretation” of EU law that it prefers. By choosing an interpretation of 
EU law, it would de facto interpret it. 
A “prevailing interpretation” of EU law might not even exist, as investors can bring 
claims against recently enacted laws, which have never been interpreted by domestic 
“courts or authorities”. For instance, in 2011 Philip Morris sued Australia before its plain 
 
49 See Permanent Court of International Justice, Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish 
Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), judgment of 25 May 1926, p. 19. 
50 Art. 8.28, para. 2, CETA. 
51 See H. LENK, An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Investment Agree-
ments, cit., p. 674. 
52 Cf. e.g. ICSID, award of 1 November 1999, case no. ARB (AF)/97/2, Azinian and Others v. Mexico, pa-
ra. 86.  
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tobacco packaging law was even adopted.53 Similarly, if the Union introduced restrictive 
tobacco packaging rules, a Canadian tobacco company might sue the European Union 
before the CETA Tribunal. The CETA Tribunal would then have to give a “meaning” to the 
EU measure providing for the packaging rules before the Court of Justice has the 
chance to do so. Therefore, there is at least the abstract possibility that the CETA Tribu-
nal might provide its own interpretation of EU law.54 
The CETA Tribunal thus seems to lack all the elements contained in the Achmea test: 
i) it is not “situated within the judicial system of the EU”, ii) its awards may not be subject 
to sufficient “review by a court of a Member State”, and iii) it might resolve disputes “lia-
ble to relate to the interpretation or application of EU law”.  
IV. It would seem that the Court drafted Achmea with Opinion 1/17 in mind, but its mes-
sage appears contradictory. On the one hand, the Court obliquely indicates that the 
findings of Achmea are not relevant for Opinion 1/17. On the other hand, Achmea intro-
duces a test applicable to both intra- and extra-EU tribunals, including the one at issue 
in Opinion procedure 1/17. 
The ambiguities of Achmea raise four questions. In the first place, does Achmea im-
ply that all international dispute settlement mechanisms are inevitably incompatible 
with EU law? It does not. As noted in section II, the Achmea test is potentially applicable 
only to tribunals deciding disputes affecting individuals’ rights, such as those at issue in 
Achmea and Opinion 1/17. It is not applicable to organs deciding disputes between in-
ternational subjects, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 
Should the Court apply the Achmea test in Opinion 1/17? Arguably, yes. The Court 
might possibly hold in Opinion 1/17 that the Achmea test cannot apply to extra-EU tribu-
nals, as it was conceived for intra-EU tribunals. However, it is difficult to imagine why the 
Achmea test, which never refers to the intra-EU characterisation of the case, should not 
apply in Opinion 1/17. It has been argued that a teleological interpretation of the Treaties 
might lead the Court to be lenient with CETA: the impossibility to include investor-to-state 
mechanisms in international agreements would allegedly constitute an obstacle for the 
EU’s external policy.55 However, one should take all EU external objectives into account.56 
Investor protection mechanisms might arguably lead to “regulatory chill”, as public au-
thorities might refrain from measures taken in the public interest because of the possibil-
 
53 See Notice of Arbitration, Australia-Hong Kong Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of In-
vestments, 21 November 2011, www.italaw.com. 
54 See P. IANNUCCELLI, La Corte di giustizia e l’autonomia del sistema giurisdizionale dell’Unione europea, 
cit., p. 303; see also N. DE SADELEER, Tribunaux d’investissement sur la sellette : CJUE, gde ch.., 6 mars 2018, 
Achmea, aff. C-284/16, in Revue des affaires européennes, 2018, p. 117 et seq., p. 125. 
55 See ibid; S. WUSCHKA, Investment Protection and the EU after Achmea, cit., p. 45. 
56 See Arts 3, para. 5, and 21 TEU, as well as Arts 205 and 207, para. 1, TFEU. 
Opinion 1/17 in Light of Achmea: Chronicle of an Opinion Foretold? 11 
ity of investment arbitration.57 Investment tribunal may indeed hold public authorities lia-
ble for measures that are the result of choices of economic or social policy,58 something 
that is normally excluded by domestic courts, precisely to avoid a regulatory chill.59 Alt-
hough CETA mentions the “right to regulate” of the parties,60 it does not seem to dramati-
cally reduce the scope of manoeuvre of its Tribunal and, hence, the risk of regulatory 
chill.61 It cannot be excluded that CETA might de facto prevent the Union to foster objec-
tives such as improving the quality of the environment or the sustainable management of 
natural resources.62 A teleological interpretation of the Treaties might thus suggest that 
the Court should not be particularly lenient with the CETA Tribunal. 
If one assumes that the Achmea test should apply to the CETA Tribunal, a third 
question comes to the fore: would the CETA Tribunal fail the Achmea test? Probably, yes. 
The negotiators sought to render CETA more palatable to the Court of Justice, by re-
straining its ability to interpret domestic law,63 by enhancing its transparency, and by 
characterising it as a permanent tribunal.64 These elements might perhaps convince the 
 
57 See e.g. K. TIENHAARA, Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science, in C. 
BROWN and K. MILES (eds), Evolution in International Treaty Law and Arbitration, New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011, p. 606 et seq.; R. LENCUCHA, R. LABONTE, J. DROPE, Tobacco Plain Packaging: Too Hot for 
Regulatory Chill, in The Lancet, 2015, p. 1723 et seq.; K. PELC, What Explains the Low Success Rate of Investor-
State Disputes?, in International Organization, 2017, p. 559 et seq. 
58 See e.g. ICSID, award of 23 May 2003, case no. ARB (AF)/00/2, Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, 
S.A. v. The United Mexican States, para. 154.  
59 See for instance Court of Justice: judgment of 9 September 2008, joined cases C-120/06 P and C-
121/06 P, FIAMM, paras 171-172; judgment of 13 June 1972, joined cases 9/71 and 11/71, Compagnie 
d’approvisionnement, de transport et de crédit and Grands Moulins de Paris, para. 13; judgment of 25 May 1978, 
joined cases 83/76, 94/76, 4/77, 15/77 and 40/77, Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe and Others, para. 5. 
See also L. JOHNSON, O. VOLKOV, Investor-State Contracts, Host-State 'Commitments' and the Myth of Stability in 
International Law, in American Review of International Arbitration, 2013, p. 361 et seq. 
60 Art. 8.9 CETA. See also C. TITI, Le «droit de réglementer» et les nouveaux accords de l'Union européenne 
sur l'investissement, in Journal du droit international, 2015, p. 39 et seq.; D. NYER, The Investment Chapter of 
the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, in Journal of International Arbitration, 2015, p. 
697 et seq., p. 700-703; F. HOFFMEISTER, G. ALEXANDRU, A First Glimpse of Light on the Emerging Invisible EU 
Model BIT, in The Journal of World Investment and Trade, 2014, p. 379 et seq., pp. 394-395. 
61 See e.g. N. PIGEON, La mise en œuvre de la compétence de l’Union européenne en matière 
d’investissements internationaux, PhD Thesis, University Paris I, 2018, pp. 535-545; M. PAPARINSKIS, Interna-
tional Investment Law and the European Union: A Reply to Catharine Titi, in European Journal of International 
Law, 2015, p. 663 et seq., p. 669. 
62 Art. 21, para. 2, let. f), TEU. 
63 In addition, CETA contains rules for determining the respondent party which are arguably aimed at 
preventing the Tribunal from passing judgment on issues of EU law, see C. CONTARTESE, L. PANTALEO, Divi-
sion of Competences, EU Autonomy and the Determination of the Respondent Party: Proceduralisation as a 
Possible Way-Out?, in E. NEFRAMI, M. GATTI (eds), Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations Law, Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2018, p. 409 et seq., pp. 436-438. 
64 H. LENK, An Investment Court System for the New Generation of EU Trade and Investment Agreements, 
cit. 
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Court to apply the Achmea test loosely in Opinion 1/17, based on the assumption that 
the CETA Tribunal will exercise restraint. However, such a scenario does not appear very 
likely. Investment tribunals are not known for their predictability and restraint65 and the 
Court of Justice is generally wary of any potential interference with the autonomy of EU 
law.66 In Opinion 2/13, in particular, it was very rigorous with a court that protects the 
human rights of individuals.67 One may expect it to be equally rigorous with a tribunal 
that protects the economic interests of investors.  
Nonetheless, it is impossible to predict how the Court will rule in Opinion 1/17 be-
cause the indications of Achmea are contradictory. Such contradictions lead to a fourth 
question: why did the Court distinguish Achmea from Opinion 1/17 in the introduction 
and conclusion of the judgment, but solved the case through a test potentially applica-
ble to CETA? One can only formulate hypotheses in this respect. The apparent contra-
dictions in Achmea may be the product of dissension within the Court or might have 
been an attempt at preserving some room of manoeuvre for the solution of future cas-
es. Alternatively, the contradictions might be the accidental consequence of a practical 
choice. The Court could use the principle of mutual trust to solve Achmea, thus distin-
guishing it from Opinion 1/17. However, the Court might have chosen not to emphasise 
mutual trust because this principle is problematic, given the authoritarian tendencies of 
some Member States, which do not exactly elicit “trust”.  
Another scenario is possible: the Court might have formulated Achmea strategically, 
to set a precedent that legitimises Opinion 1/17 ex ante. The composition of the Court 
might be remarkable: while Opinion 1/09, Opinion 2/13, and Opinion 1/17 were as-
signed to the plenary, Achmea was decided by a Grand Chamber.68 A majority of the 
Grand Chamber, which might be a minority in the plenary, may have intended to trail-
blaze the path for Opinion 1/17. To throw critics off, the Court might have deliberately 
inserted contradictory elements in Achmea, thereby preventing one from concluding 




65 See e.g. UNCTAD, Fair and Equitable Treatment: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment 
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